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SUPPORTING PILOTS IN CLOSE ENCOUNTERS WITH TERRAIN
A.N.P. Lenaerts, C. Borst, M. Mulder and M.M. van Paassen
Aerospace Engineering, Delft University of Technology
Delft, The Netherlands
Despite the fact that modern cockpits present an abundance of information to pilots, Controlled Flight Into Terrain
(CFIT) accidents continue to occur. The introduction of terrain awareness and warning systems, like the Enhanced
Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), has led to a considerabl reduction of terrain incursions. EGPWS
predicts the aircraft motion relative to terrain and, basedon a rule-base of advanced reasoning logic, informs pilots on
how to react appropriately. Common to all terrain warning systems, is that all cognition is ‘hidden’ in the EGPWS
logic, and pilots are required to respond rapidly to the system’s commands. We hypothesize that pilot decision making
is accelerated and situation awareness is improved when thei ternal functioning of terrain awareness and warning
systems is clarified, visualized on the interface. To test thi hypothesis we developed two extensions to the EGPWS.
In the first, the EGPWS flight path prediction was presented, toclarify the look-ahead function. In the second, also
the potential escape trajectories were presented. A simulator experiment was conducted where twelve general aviation
pilots were brought in close encounter with terrain, with the ree EGPWS variations. Results show that when the
EGPWS internal reasoning is visualized to pilots, situationawareness significantly improved.
Introduction
Alerting systems have been developed to prevent Con-
trolled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents that direct
the attention of the pilot to the terrain-threatening sit-
uation (Pritchett, 2001). An example is the Enhanced
Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) which
presents nearby terrain and obstacles and, when fly-
ing too close, provides an alert (Honeywell, 2000).
Based on a prediction of the aircraft motion relative
to the terrain, the ‘look-ahead’ function, internal rea-
soning logic evaluates the situation. Dependent on the
moment when terrain is predicted to be encountered,
bright colored terrain is shown on the Terrain Aware-
ness Display (TAD), and an aural alert is given.
Despite the fact that these systems have shown to re-
duce the number of terrain incursions, some problems
remain. The main problem is that all cognition is
‘hidden’ in the alerting system’s logic. Pilots are not
supported at all in diagnosing the threat themselves
(Abeloos, Egging, Mulder, Van Paassen and Pritch-
ett, 2003), and as a consequence, pilots do not always
have time to understand what exactly is going on, and
often simply follow the alert system commands. Espe-
cially in bad weather conditions or when pilots are dis-
tracted, the time to make a decision is short, which de-
teriorates performance considerably (Pritchett, 2001).
We investigated how a conventional EGPWS can be
improved upon through providing more meaningful in-
formation that helps the pilot in better understanding
the reasoning of the EGPWS. The exploration is done
for general aviation aircraft, manually controlled by pi-
lots without the aid of flight management systems and
air traffic control.
Two improvements were considered. First, the con-
straints encountered by the ‘the look-ahead function’
are visualized, revealing the internal functioning of
this EGPWS capability. Second, the resolution advi-
sories, both in the vertical plane as well as in the lat-
eral plane, are presented on a Vertical Situation Dis-
play (VSD) and Horizontal Situation Display (HSD),
respectively. An experiment was conducted to in-
vestigate the potential benefits of these EGPWS en-
hancements on pilot situation awareness, manual con-
trol performance, safety, and workload. This paper
summarizes the EGPWS enhancements and the exper-
imental results. For more details the reader is referred
to (Lenaerts, 2006).
Enhancing terrain awareness warning systems
Most CFIT accidents are attributed to the short reac-
tion time provided by alerting systems after the pilot’s
attention is directed (Moroze and Snow, 1999). The pi-
lot needs more time to react than the alerting system’s
algorithm has foreseen. Situation awareness of the pi-
lot is too low to be able to react immediately. They do
not know their position with respect to terrain and do
not readily understand where the alert comes from.
The main problem is that terrain awareness systems
do not clearly enough explain what happens. They do
a poor job in clarifying the meaning of the hazard in
terms ofwhy the pilot should dowhat, how andwhen
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to avoid the threatening terrain. Furthermore, the alert-
ing system is a safety system, the role of which does
not evolve through day-to-day operations, but is only
experienced by the pilot when a hazard appears. The
judgment of the alerting system is based on its sen-
sors, its algorithms and decision thresholds, i.e. on in-
formation that is normally not accessible to the pilot.
It is important to decrease the gap between these judg-
ments of the human and the machine in order to enable
a quick, corrective action in a critical situation.
Ideally, the situation display must “explain” the inter-
nal logic of the terrain awareness system. Furthermore,
the system and its situation display must be consonant,
i.e., they must promote the same action. This poses not
only a requirement on the situation display to provide
alerting system awareness, but also a limitation on the
alerting system: in order to communicate its function-
ing, the alerting system’s logic must be communicable,
limiting its allowable complexity (Bainbridge, 1983).
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning and Avoidance
System (EGPWAS)
Inspired by the work presented in (Borst, Suikerbuik,
Mulder and Van Paassen, 2006) and (Amelink, Mul-
der, Van Paassen and Flach, 2005), our team developed
the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning and Avoid-
ance System (EGPWAS).
EGPWAS logic
The logic of the EGPWAS is based on relating ‘inter-
nal aircraft constraints’, i.e., the aircraft performance
characteristics in terms of its capability to turn and
climb, to the ‘external terrain constraints’, i.e., the lim-
its to moving in space imposed by the terrain. In other
words, the EGPWAS presents information about what
the capabilities of the aircraft are with respect to the
threatening terrain, through a visual interface that con-
sists of a conventional Horizontal Situation Display
(HSD) and Vertical Situation Display (VSD).
In the context of avoiding terrain, the main aircraft per-
formance limit in the vertical plane is its ability to per-
form a steep climb. As discussed in detail in (Borst
et al., 2006), the climb contains of two parts: a pull-
up, where excess in speed is exchanged into height,
followed by a quasi-stationary climbing flight. In the
lateral plane, avoiding terrain implies turning, and here
the aircraft turning capability is the primary constraint.
The radius of the turn depends on the aircraft speed
(for higher speeds the radius is larger) and the roll an-
gle of the aircraft (for higher roll angles the radius is
smaller). In both the lateral and vertical plane, the air-
craft load factor should remain within limits (< 1.4),
limiting the aircraft roll angle to approximately 45 de-
grees.
Similar to the conventional EGPWS, the EGPWAS
provides provides an envelope of protection through its
‘look-ahead function’, based upon approximate time-
to-impact of the aircraft with terrain. Using the aircraft
current states in terms of position, attitude and speed,
the EGPWAS predicts the aircraft future position and
checks it with the terrain database. The algorithms of
the EGPWAS look down, and keeps a vertical safety
margin of 500 ft; ahead, based on the aircraft ground
speed, up to 60 seconds ahead; aside, based on the air-
craft bank angle (maximum 45 degrees); and up, based
on maximum climb path angle.
EGPWAS interface
The interface of the EGPWAS consists of the HSD and
VSD displays, and an aural alert. When no threaten-
ing terrain lies within 60 seconds ahead of the aircraft,
terrain is displayed on the HSD and VSD, using con-
ventional EGPWS color coding. The color coding and
aural alerts in case threatening terrain lies within 60
seconds ahead is also similar to the conventional EG-
PWS.
Furthermore, together with the aural alert, the least
tight possible turn is shown on the HSD by means of
a solid arc symbol. The size of the arc depends on
the aircraft ground speed and the terrain profile which
imposes constraints on the bank angle required. The
color of the arc indicates the required bank angle of
the escape turn maneuver, where a yellow arc indicates
a bank angle of 15 degrees, an orange arc indicates a
bank angle of 30 degrees, and a red arc indicates a bank
angle of 45 degrees. If turning away from the threaten-
ing terrain is not possible anymore, the arc is colored
black.
At the time an aural alert is given, a possible escape
maneuver is also displayed on the VSD as well. In the
longitudinal plane, only the steepest climb is analyzed.
The first part of the climb symbol, the pull-up arc, de-
pends on the current ground speed. The color of the
steepest climb symbol is consistent with the warning
and caution alert color coding of the EGPWS. Again,
a black climb symbol means that it is not possible any-
more to escape the threatening terrain by performing
the steepest climb.
In Figure 1 the layout of the HSD and VSD, corre-
sponding with the EGPWAS, is presented. In the top
figure ➊ is the compass with the current heading in
degrees;➋ is a zoom level on the display;➌ is the
EGPWS color coding for terrain which is not in the
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Figure 1: EGPWS display layout: HSD (top) and VSD
(bottom) presentation.
vicinity of the aircraft;➍ is the EGPWS caution and
warning color coding for threatening terrain; finally,
➎ are the turn symbols, a 30 degree bank angle turn to
the right and a 45 degree bank angle turn to the left are
both an option to escape from the threatening terrain.
The bottom figure shows:➀ the altitude tape in feet;➁
the look ahead distance [nm] along the aircraft’s flight
path;➂ the aircraft’s symbol;➃ EGPWS colored ter-
rain in the vicinity of the aircraft, this EGPWS color
coding is clarified by➄, the EGPWS warning➅ rep-
resents the pull-up maneuver to obtain➆, the steepest
climbing flight.
Experiment
METHOD
Apparatus The experiment was conducted in a
fixed-base flight simulator with an hydraulic side stick,
rudder pedals, pedestal controls (two throttle levers,
flap lever and a speed brake lever) and two 18” LCD
panels for the instrument displays.
Subjects and instructions Twelve Instrument Flight
Rules (IFR) rated general aviation pilots were invited,
all males, and with 200-1500 flying hours.
The subjects were asked to observe a specific frozen
unexpected emergency situation and answer some
questions about it. Afterwards, they were instructed
to escape from the threatening situation, by executing
only the following four maneuvers: full climb at 92%
power, turn at a bank angle of 15, 30 or 45 degrees.
Combinations of these maneuvers were not allowed.
Aircraft and weather model A non-linear Cessna Ci-
tation 500 aircraft model was used. The aircraft was
trimmed for a straight level flight at 8250 ft at a veloc-
ity of 150 kts IAS. An ISA standard atmosphere was
used and no wind or turbulence was simulated.
Independent variables Two independent variables
were defined: display format and terrain layout. Three
display formats, for both the HSD and VSD, were used
(see Figure 2), where each of the displays was ac-
companied by the conventional Primary Flight Display
(PFD), engine display and the conventional EGPWS
color coding and aural alerts:
Baseline (BASE) - current EGPWS. This display was
the conventional display of the currently used
EGPWS, presenting terrain in specific colors cor-
responding to terrain elevations, defined by Hon-
eywell. The VSD only showed the terrain profile
with EGPWS color coding and flight path vector.
Clarified EGPWS (c-EGPWS). The baseline, ex-
tended with a visual representation of the pre-
dicted flight path 60 seconds ahead to clarify the
underlying principle of the EGPWS to the pilots.
This flight path was also shown on the VSD. This
allowed pilots to estimate the time to collision
with the threatening terrain.
EGPWAS. The display format with extra indications
about escape possibilities, in the lateral (HSD)
and longitudinal plane (VSD), to avoid terrain.
The terrain layout consisted of six different existing
North-American terrains. For each terrain a CFIT sit-
uation was created by positioning the aircraft in such a
way that it will collide with the terrain when the pilot
does not perform an escape maneuver. The scenarios
were defined as follows:
Aspen: threatening terrain lies around 30 seconds
away. To escape, only a steep climb maneuver
is possible.
Eagle: threatening terrain lies between 0 and 30 sec-
onds away. To escape, tight turns to the left and
the right with a bank angle of at least 45 degrees
are the only possibilities.
Colorado Springs: threatening terrain lies between 0
and 30 seconds away. To escape, the following
maneuvers are possible: a steep climb and a turn
to the right with a bank angle of at least 30 de-
grees.
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(a) Baseline (BASE) (b) Clarified EGPWS (c-EGPWS) (c) EGPWAS
Figure 2: Display formats
Reno: threatening terrain lies between 0 and 30 de-
grees away. To escape, two maneuvers are pos-
sible: a turn to the right with a bank angle of at
least 30 degrees or a tight turn to the left with a
bank angle of at least 45 degrees.
Truckee-Tahoe: no threatening terrain will be en-
countered within 60 seconds. Here no escape ma-
neuver is necessary, although the alert is given. It
is a false alarm.
Yampa: threatening terrain lies between 30 and 60
seconds away. To escape, all maneuvers are pos-
sible: steep climb, soft turn with a bank angle of
at least 15 degrees to the right or the left. In this
scenario, it would be wise to turn away from the
threatening terrain, to avoid further difficulties.
Experiment design The six terrain scenarios, in
combination with a specific display format, were each
used only once by each pilot. In total 72 runs were
done (6 scenarios× 12 pilots), which were organized
in a Latin Squares design.
Dependent measures The dependent measures were:
1) situation awareness, 2) subjective symbology rat-
ings, 3) performance and safety, and, 4) pilot work-
load.
Situation Awareness. SA, in terms of percep-
tion, comprehension, projection and metacogni-
tion (McGuinness, 1999), was measured using
questions about the current situation, which were
different for each run, and a post-run question-
naire. The questionnaire consists of 9 questions,
3 for each level. Examples of questions for first,
second and third level of SA are respectively
“What is your indicated airspeed?”, “What is the
level of risk?” and “Is it possible to escape the ter-
rain threat by performing a horizontal 45 degree
bank angle turn to the right?”. To quantify these
first three levels, a model was created to specify
whether pilots were incorrect, far off, almost cor-
rect or correct. These levels were graded with 0,
3, 6 or 9, respectively. The thresholds between
the levels to which the given answer was to be
directed, were partly determined by expert sub-
jects and partly by comparing the correct answer
to a question. The fourth level of terrain aware-
ness metacognition, was measured through a con-
fidence interval. Next to each question the pilots
indicated on this interval their self-confidence,
with a number ranging from 0 to 10, 0 being very
unsure and 10 being very sure. Of the indicated
values a z-score was taken, with which the pilots
were graded 0, 1, 2, 3, 6 or 9 for the metacog-
nition. The determination of the metacognition
grade was done through a combination of the self-
confidence interval and the grade obtained for the
question itself. With these two numbers Table 1
was used.
Symbology. The measurement involved questions re-
lated to the symbology of a specific display for-
mat. Pilots gave their opinion, by using a 10 point
Likert-scale, about each of the following three
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Table 1: Score system to measure metacognition.
Correct Incorrect
Very sure (z > 0.33) 9 0
Fairly sure (0.33 > z > −0.33) 6 1
Unsure (z < −0.33) 3 2
statements: “I knew exactly how much time was
left before collision”, “I knew exactly when to
perform a maneuver”, and, “I knew exactly which
maneuver would be the best to escape safely.”
The z-scores of the subjective ratings on each
statement are examined.
Performance and safety. The performance of the pi-
lot was evaluated by measuring the longitudinal
and vertical separation with terrain. Safety is
analyzed by counting the number of intrusions
and crashes. Four categories of intrusions into
a safety margin above the terrain surface are de-
fined: Very soft intrusions (1000ft-750ft), soft
intrusions (750ft-500ft), hard intrusions (500ft-
250ft).
Workload. The workload was measured by means of
a NASA TLX rating scale.
Experiment procedure The experiment consisted of
two phases: training and measurement. In the mea-
surement phase, pilots were confronted with a frozen
situation and could observe all displays in this situa-
tion for 12 seconds. Then, the simulation was briefly
interrupted and the pilot was asked to answer 9 situ-
ation awareness-related questions. Next, the simula-
tion was started and the pilots had to escape from the
threatening terrain. After completing the evasive ma-
neuver, pilots were asked to complete a NASA TLX
rating sheet. Finally, at the end of an experiment run,
symbology related questions were asked.
Results and discussion
For a detailed discussion, see (Lenaerts, 2006).
Situation awareness
Considering each level of SA separately (Figures 3(a)-
3(c)) indicates a borderline effect at the ‘perception’
level, no effect at the ‘comprehension’ level, and a
highly-significant effect (F2,125 = 6.705, p ≤ 0.01) at
the ‘projection’ level. Metacognition (Figure 3(d)) is
significantly higher with the enhanced systems as com-
pared to BASE (F2,413 = 3.459, 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05),
indicating that pilots are more confident about their un-
derstanding of the situation.
Subjective symbology measures
The z-scores of the subjective ratings of statement 1,
“I knew exactly how much time was left before colli-
sion”, (Figure 4(a)) are higher for c-EGPWS and EG-
PWAS than BASE, a borderline effect. The z-scores
of the subjective rating of statement 2, “I knew exactly
when to perform a maneuver”, (Figure 4(b)) are higher
for EGPWAS as compared to BASE and c-EGPWS
(not significant). The z-scores for statement 3, “I
knew exactly which maneuver would be best to escape
safely”, (Figure 4(c)) are much higher for EGPWAS, a
highly-significant effect (F2,18 = 7.003, p ≤ 0.01).
Performance and safety
Less intrusions or crashes were found with EGPWAS
(Table 2), a result that was not significant, however
(Wilcoxon). Many intrusions were caused when pilots
executed a turn and lost altitude. In the experiment
only one crash occurred, in scenario 2 with BASE.
Table 2: Number of intrusions(I = BASE, II = c-EGPWS,
III = EGPWAS).
very soft soft hard
intrusion intrusion intrusion
scenario I II III I II III I II III
1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 13 7 9 7 2 0 4 1 0
3 1 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
total 17 11 13 7 2 0 4 1 0
Workload
Workload (Figure 4(d)) remains the same for all dis-
play formats, although the (not-significant) trend is in
favor of c-EGPWS and EGPWAS.
Concluding remarks
Clarifying the internal logic of a terrain warning sys-
tem like the EGPWS, enhances pilot performance.
Sharing cognition between the automation and crew
yields a higher level of situation awareness, in partic-
ular at the highest level, ‘projection’. Pilots are more
aware ofwhen an evasive maneuver needs to be con-
ducted, and alsowhat maneuver (turn or climb) would
be the most appropriate. They are better able to ‘con-
nect’ the constraints on their flight as imposed by the
terrain with the constraints on their flight that are due
to the aircraft performance. As a result, the opportuni-
ties for action become much more clear, to the benefit
of performance and safety.
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Figure 3: Situation awareness scores with 95% confidence interval.
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
BASE c-EGPWSEGPWAS
9
5
%
C
Iz
-s
co
re
(a) statement 1 (‘time’)
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
BASE c-EGPWSEGPWAS
9
5
%
C
Iz
-s
co
re
(b) statement 2 (‘when’)
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
BASE c-EGPWSEGPWAS
9
5
%
C
Iz
-s
co
re
(c) statement 3 (‘what’)
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
BASE c-EGPWS EGPWAS
9
5
%
C
Iz
-s
co
re
(d) workload (TLX)
Figure 4: Subjective ratings (z-scores with 95% confidence itervals) on symbology and workload.
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